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Transparency, Inequity Aversion, and the Dynamics of 
Peer Pressure in Teams: Theory and Evidence 
 
We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing 
a two-period model with two agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly 
depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents act as if 
they were purely selfish. However, when contributions are made transparent at an interim 
stage, agents exert higher efforts in the first period and adjust their efforts according to the 
interim information in the second period. This form of peer pressure reduces free-riding and 
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 1 Introduction
In many real world contexts work results cannot be assigned to a particular
person but merely to a group of people or a team. In that case any kind
of performance dependent compensation is accompanied by the danger of
free-riding and consequently ine¢ cient e⁄ort levels. This problem has been
discussed comprehensively in the theoretical and empirical literature in recent
decades (e.g. Holmstr￿m (1982), Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Newhouse
(1973), or Prendergast (1999) for a survey).
However, it is sometimes claimed that peer pressure e⁄ects induce team
members to work harder and to reduce free-riding. In this paper, we therefore
provide a theoretical explanation for peer pressure e⁄ects based on agents￿
inequity aversion. In a second step, we then test the implications of our the-
ory in a real e⁄ort experiment. One of the key objectives of our investigation
is to study the impact of the information structure on the development of
peer pressure in teams.
We ￿rst consider a simple model in which two agents can contribute to a
certain task and both are paid based on the total output of the team. Indi-
vidual contributions depend on the e⁄ort exerted. We compare two settings:
In the ￿rst setting, both agents can observe their respective contributions
only after the end of the game. In the second setting each team member
obtains intermediate information on the contribution of his team partner at
an interim stage. We assume that both agents are inequity averse over their
contributions, i.e. each dislikes contributing more or less to the ￿nal out-
come than his team partner. We show that inequity aversion indeed a⁄ects
the outcome provided that interim information on the respective contribu-
tions is given. The key mechanism is the following: When it has turned out
that one of the agents has contributed more to a task than his team partner
an inequitable situation arises. The team partner will have an incentive to
reduce this inequity by exerting more e⁄ort in the following period. On the
other hand, the agent who contributed more has an incentive to reduce his
2e⁄ort level. Hence, an interdependency arises between past outcomes and
future contributions. But this has an important e⁄ect on the incentives to
contribute early in the game as a higher contribution in the present raises
the coworker￿ s willingness to raise his e⁄ort in the future. Hence, this e⁄ect
increases the marginal return of e⁄ort and leads to higher e⁄ort levels early
in the game if the respective contributions are made transparent.
However, if individual contributions are not transparent and become
known only at the end of the game, we show that inequity aversion has
no impact on equilibrium e⁄ort levels as inequity averse agents act exactly
like purely sel￿sh agents would.
We test several hypotheses derived from the model in a real e⁄ort experi-
ment. Each of the participants in the experiment was requested to perform a
tedious counting task on a computer screen. Teams of two participants were
remunerated with a linear piece rate based on the sum of correct answers of
both participants. In the ￿rst condition participants learned the correct an-
swers which their team partner attained at intermediate stages of the game.
In the other condition they did not receive that information before the end of
the experiment. The main hypotheses derived from the model are con￿rmed:
Altogether participants yield more correct answers when knowing that their
team mates were informed about the intermediate outcomes. In addition,
we ￿nd evidence that the di⁄erence between outcomes within the team in
the previous period indeed has a strong impact on individual outcomes in
subsequent periods. Interestingly we observe an asymmetry in the reaction:
Whereas an agent who has contributed more than his colleague in the previ-
ous period reduces his e⁄ort strongly, having contributed less only leads to
a weak increase in future e⁄ort.
Among the ￿rst introducing the idea of peer pressure in economic team
models are Kandel and Lazear (1992). In their model, team members can
choose certain actions that raise the cost of a reduction in individual produc-
tive e⁄ort for the other team members. However, the mechanism by which
3the costs of productive e⁄ort are increased is not studied endogenously in
the model. Barron and Gjerde (1997) ￿nd that the existence of peer pressure
can result in the optimality of lower powered incentives. Che and Yoo (2001)
show that team incentives are more e⁄ective in an in￿nitely repeated game
as team members can sanction past behavior of their colleagues. Knez and
Simester (2001) ￿nd that the introduction of a company wide team incen-
tive scheme at Continental airlines raised productivity signi￿cantly. They
explain their result by claiming that mutual monitoring and peer pressure
e⁄ects counterbalanced free-riding. Backes-Gellner et al. (2006) investigate
a Kandel-Lazear type peer pressure model and ￿nd a concave relationship
between team size and peer pressure which they con￿rm by empirically an-
alyzing the e⁄ort exerted in groups of founders.
There is some previous experimental evidence on peer pressure in teams.
Falk and Ichino (2006) show that subjects working at the same time in the
same room work harder than subjects in a control treatment with one per-
son working in a room all alone. In contrast to our study they remunerate
their subjects with a ￿xed wage. Hence, increasing the other￿ s incentives to
contribute more can be no motive in their experiment. Sausgruber (2005)
examines peer e⁄ects between teams rather than within teams. He ￿nds that
the average contribution of the other team in the previous period is positively
correlated to the contribution of a person to the own team output in the cur-
rent period. Empirical evidence for the importance of peer e⁄ects in ￿rms
have for instance also been given by Ichino and Maggi (2000).
Our paper is of course also strongly related to the literature on social
preferences. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) show
that many experimental results can be explained when allowing for the possi-
bility that some agents￿utility decreases in the inequality of payo⁄s between
agents. Recently a literature has emerged analyzing the incentive e⁄ects of
several contractual forms when agents are inequity averse. Examples are for
instance Biel (2004), Englmaier and Wambach (2002), Demougin and Fluet
4(2003), Grund and Sliwka (2005), or Itoh (2004).1 Most closely related to
the theoretical part of our paper is Huck and Biel (2006) who give a rationale
for leadership behavior in a game in which two agents are remunerated with
a team incentive scheme. They show that output is higher when one of the
agents (i.e. the leader) can act as a ￿rst mover as his e⁄ort level in￿ uences
his follower when the latter is inequity averse. Masclet (2002) allows for
punishment of shirking colleagues which is used in order to achieve equity.
Our analysis is also related to theoretical literature on dynamic volun-
tary contributions to public goods. Whereas for instance Admati (1991) or
Fershtman and Nitzan (1991) have shown that dynamic interaction may ac-
tually aggravate the free-rider problem2 we ￿nd that even though the game
is ￿nite dynamic interaction may reduce free-riding when agents are inequity
averse.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present
the model where the theoretical results regarding the non-transparent and
transparent setting are developed in sections 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. The
experimental design and hypotheses are described in 3.1 and 3.2. Section 3.3
deals with the empirical results. The last section concludes.
2 The Model
To examine the e⁄ects of transparency and inequity aversion on contributions
to a team task, we consider the following set-up. Two risk neutral agents
i = 1;2 are working in team in two periods t = 1;2. Each agent i can
contribute an e⁄ort eit to the team task in period t. The agents￿costs of e⁄ort
in each period are represented by a quadratic cost function, c
2e2
it with c > 0.
We assume that only the sum of e⁄orts is veri￿able such that individual piece
rates are infeasible. Both agents receive a ￿xed wage as well as a team bonus
1For an overview see for instance Englmaier (2004).
2In contrast to these results, Marx and Matthews (2000) investigate a case in which
e¢ cient contribution levels can only be attained in a dynamic framework.
5paid at the end of period 2:
wi = ￿ + ￿
2 X
t=1
(eit + ejt) for i = 1;2: (1)
Given this compensation scheme, the variable payment depends on the total
team output, i.e. the sum of the contributions of both team members in both
periods. Furthermore, we assume that both agents are inequity averse over
their respective contributions. The utility function of an agent over both
periods is given by





















2 ￿ ￿2 if ￿ < 0
d
2 ￿ ￿2 if ￿ > 0
with d ￿ a ￿ 0 where ￿ =
P2
t=1 (eit ￿ ejt) represents the total excess contri-
bution of a player over his coworker￿ s contribution across both periods. Thus,
the utility of agent i equals his remuneration less his e⁄ort costs in both peri-
ods and an expression re￿ ecting the utility loss from inequity in contributions
within the team. It is obvious that the agents do not su⁄er from inequity
aversion when both contribute equally over both periods. But if the sum
of contributions over both periods is not the same for both agents, inequity
aversion leads to a loss in utility. Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999) we
allow for the possibility that disadvantageous inequity brings about a larger
utility loss than advantageous inequity. Note that this includes the possibil-
ity that a = 0 such that we also investigate the case where the agent su⁄ers
only from inequity in contributions when it is to his disadvantage. Since it
seems reasonable, that bigger di⁄erences lead to more than a proportional
e⁄ect on the disutility of inequity than small di⁄erences in contributions, we
6model the utility loss of the di⁄erences in contributions as a convex function.
In our analysis we compare two cases. In the ￿rst case both agents obtain
the information about their respective contribution to the team output at an
interim stage after the ￿rst period. One possible interpretation would be
that they closely work together in a transparent environment and therefore
can observe their respective contributions after each period. Another expla-
nation would be that feedback is given by a central manager after the ￿rst
period who informs both agents about each others￿contributions. We call
this the transparent case. In the second case this intermediate information
is not given but agents learn their respective contributions only after the
second period. This case is labeled non-transparent case. Payo⁄ functions
are exactly the same in both cases.3
It is worthwhile to consider two reference cases for the subsequent analy-
sis. On the one hand, it is useful to compare the results with the equilibrium
e⁄ort choices of purely sel￿sh agents. It is straightforward to see that in
the unique Nash equilibrium both agents choose an e⁄ort level of
￿
c in this
case. But another important benchmark is the ￿team best￿solution, i.e. the
joint welfare maximizing e⁄ort levels chosen when both agents could write
a binding side contract. As the marginal return of each unit of individual




We ￿rst solve the game for the case where contributions are unobservable at
the interim stage after period 1. Here, an agent knows in the ￿rst period, that
his contributions will not be observed by the other agent before the second
period ends. Hence, agents cannot react to their respective counterpart￿ s
3As we are interested in the impact of inequity aversion on e⁄ort provision, we focus
on the agents￿decisions rather than on the princpal￿ s. Therefore we do not analyze the
principal￿ s optimal contracting. However, if agents are protected by limited liability, it
can be shown that the principal will choose ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1=2.
7contribution. Agent i￿ s second period utility function is






The agent maximizes this expression given his own ￿rst period e⁄ort choice
ei1 and his coworker￿ s equilibrium strategies ^ ej1 and ^ ej2. The ￿rst order
condition with respect to the second period e⁄ort level is
￿ ￿ ￿
0 (ei1 + ei2 ￿ ^ ej1 ￿ ^ ej2) ￿ cei2 = 0;
implicitly de￿ning the agent￿ s second period reaction function e￿
i2 (ei1; ^ ej1; ^ ej2).
When choosing the ￿rst period e⁄ort level, the agent will of course anticipate
his own reaction in the second period. But by the envelope theorem, the ￿rst
order condition for the ￿rst period e⁄ort choice corresponds to that in the
second period. Hence, we must always have that ei1 = ei2 = ei and
￿ ￿ ￿
0 (2ei ￿ 2^ ej) ￿ cei = 0 and
￿ ￿ ￿
0 (2ej ￿ 2^ ei) ￿ cej = 0:




for i = 1;2 and t = 1;2:
Moreover, this equilibrium is unique as is shown in the following result
Proposition 1 When agents cannot observe their respective contributions at
the interim stage there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where e⁄ort





for i = 1;2 and t = 1;2.
Proof: See Appendix.
8It is important to note that without transparency, the introduction of in-
equity aversion over contributions does not alter the equilibrium predictions
compared to the case where agents are purely sel￿sh. As the agents do not
receive any information about their colleague￿ s contribution to the team re-
sult after the ￿rst period, agents cannot adapt their e⁄ort choices contingent
on their observation of that contribution.
One might raise the question of why the equilibrium is unique and no
higher e⁄ort levels can be sustained as the agents are inequity averse and
therefore should have some incentive to match a co-worker￿ s expected contri-
bution. The reason for that is that agents exhibit ￿increasing sensitivity to
inequity￿and do not care so much for small amounts of inequity. To see that
note the following: Suppose there was an equilibrium with e0 >
￿
c. If now an
agent reduces his e⁄ort level below e0 by an in￿nitesimal amount his wage is
reduced by ￿ and the costs of e⁄ort are reduced by c￿e0 which is larger than
￿. Hence, the e⁄ort reduction has a ￿rst order e⁄ect on the agent￿ s ￿mate-
rial well-being￿which increases by c ￿ e0 ￿ ￿ > 0. There is also an e⁄ect on
the disutility of inequity because the deviating agent does not match e0 but
this is only a second order e⁄ect as ￿ (0) = 0. Hence, a deviation is always
bene￿cial unless e =
￿
c. But this is no longer the case when contributions
are transparent as will become clear in the following section.
2.2 Observable Contributions
In the transparency case, the contributions to the team output are observed
by both agents at an interim stage. We examine how the observability of ei1
and ej1 in￿ uences the agents￿decisions. Agents are symmetrically informed
at the beginning of period 2. In period 2 agent i maximizes his utility
max
ei2






9where ^ ej2 is his coworker￿ s equilibrium strategy in the second period. Suppose
without loss of generality that agent i contributes weakly more than his
coworker in equilibrium over both periods, i.e. ei1 + ei2 ￿ ej1 + ej2. Then
the ￿rst order conditions of the agents￿ s second period objective functions
are given by
￿ ￿ d(ei1 ￿ ej1 + ei2 ￿ ^ ej2) ￿ cei2 = 0 and
￿ ￿ a(￿[ei1 ￿ ej1 + ^ ei2 ￿ ej2]) ￿ cej2 = 0;
from where we obtain the following reaction functions
ei2 =




￿ + a(ei1 ￿ ej1 + ^ ei2)
(c + a)
: (4)
Note that ei2 is increasing in ^ ej2 and ej1 and decreasing in ei1. Besides
the monetary motive, the agent￿ s e⁄ort choice is guided by his objective to
minimize the expected disutility from inequity. An agent works the harder,
the more e⁄ort is exerted by his colleague in equilibrium in the current period
and the higher the contribution of his colleague in the previous period has
been. He works the less, the more he himself has contributed in the previous
period.
When solving this system of equations we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 When contributions are transparent at the interim stage and







c + a + d






c + a + d
(ei1 ￿ ej1): (6)
10An agent who contributed less in the ￿rst period will now contribute more
and the one who contributed more will make a smaller contribution than his
coworker. If d > a the total output in the second period is strictly decreasing
in the di⁄erence in ￿rst period e⁄ort levels ei1 ￿ ej1.
Proof: See Appendix.
Now, the e⁄orts exerted in the second period depend upon the actual
output in the ￿rst period. When the ￿rst period contributions of both agents
di⁄er, the agent with the higher contribution exerts a lower and the one
with the lower contribution chooses a higher second period e⁄ort level than
in the case without transparency (or the case where all agents are purely
sel￿sh). An agent whose ￿rst contribution has been high, feels less obliged
to exert higher e⁄ort levels in the second period. On the other hand, an
agent whose ￿rst period contribution has been low, strives to make up for
the di⁄erence by exerting a higher e⁄ort level in the second period. However,
when disadvantageous inequity has a stronger impact on an agent￿ s utility
than advantageous inequity, i.e. d > a, the latter e⁄ect is weaker than the
former. In this case, the sum of both e⁄ort levels ei2+ej2 is strictly decreasing
in the di⁄erence in ￿rst period e⁄ort levels.
It is interesting to note that the di⁄erence in total contributions is
ei1 ￿ ej1 + ei2 ￿ ej2 =
c
c + a + d
(ei1 ￿ ej1):
Hence, when one agent has contributed more in the ￿rst period, the same
agent will in the end make the larger total contribution. When ￿rst pe-
riod contributions are unequal, this inequity will be reduced but it will not
disappear entirely.























11now taking the e⁄ect of ei1 on the equilibrium strategies of both agents
in period 2 into account. Note that the functional form of an agent i￿ s
objective function in the ￿rst period depends on whether ei1 ￿ ^ ej1. Due to
the asymmetry in the utility loss from inequity, the second period reaction
on di⁄erences in ￿rst period contributions will depend on whether the agent
has contributed more or less than his coworker. Using the second period
equilibrium strategies (5) and (6) the ￿rst period objective function of agent
i becomes













































if ei1 < ^ ej1
:

















(c+a+d)2 (ei1 ￿ ^ ej1) ￿ cei1 if ei < ^ ej1
:
The second derivative of the objective function is always negative, i.e. the
function is strictly concave. Hence, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for
the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in which both agents choose the
same e⁄ort level e￿
1 in the ￿rst period is that the right derivative is weakly
negative and the left derivative weakly positive at ei1 = ^ ej1 = e￿





c + 2a + d








c + 2d + a
c + a + d
￿
:
As this set is non-empty there are multiple symmetric equilibria in the ￿rst
period. Furthermore, there are no asymmetric equilibria as shown in the
following result:
12Proposition 3 When contributions are transparent, there is a continuum
of pure strategy equilibria in the ￿rst period, which all are symmetric. The
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If a > 0; ￿rst period e⁄ort and utility levels are always higher than in the
non-transparent setting.
Proof: See Appendix.
Note that the ￿rst period e⁄ort levels are always between the sel￿shly
optimal e⁄ort level of
￿




c+a+d < 2. Hence, although inequity aversion does not solve the free-rider
problem perfectly, it reduces free-riding even in a ￿nitely repeated game. In
the ￿rst period, both work harder in the transparency case even in the worst
possible equilibrium as long as agents dislike advantageous inequity at least
to some extent. By exerting higher e⁄ort levels in the ￿rst period an agent
can increase his team partner￿ s costs to free-ride in the second period which
are due to a utility loss caused by inequity aversion.
But this mechanism only works when contributions are made transparent
at the interim stage. Hence, the principal will always prefer a situation in
which the agents observe each others￿contributions providing him with higher
e⁄orts in the ￿rst period and thus higher total e⁄orts. Moreover, also the
agents bene￿t from the reduction of the free-riding problem as their utility
is larger when contributions are transparent.
It is interesting to consider the special case where agents su⁄er only a util-
ity loss when inequity is to their disadvantage but do not feel bad when they
have contributed less, i.e. a = 0 in our model. Note that in this case an agent
13cannot induce his coworker to work harder by exerting a higher e⁄ort level.
Hence, the e⁄ort levels exerted by purely sel￿sh agents (i.e. ei1 = ej1 =
￿
c)
are part of a feasible equilibrium. But other equilibria exist as well as the









higher e⁄ort levels can be attained, and moreover, these other feasible equi-
libria pareto-dominate the sel￿sh equilibrium. To understand the reason for
the existence of these pareto-superior equilibria consider the following: Sup-
pose that an agent believes that his coworker exerts an e⁄ort level ^ ej1 strictly
larger than
￿
c. When the agent matches ^ ej1, both will choose an e⁄ort level
of
￿
c in the second period. However, a deviation to a lower e⁄ort in the ￿rst
period will lead his coworker to reduce his second period e⁄ort below the
sel￿shly optimal level of
￿
c as the coworker wants to reduce the disadvanta-
geous inequity between contributions. It is therefore better to match ^ ej1 as
long as it is not too large. Hence, the avoidance of disadvantageous inequity
generates a credible threat that low team contributions will be punished in
the future and this may well help to reduce the free-rider problem.
Hence, our results show that inequity aversion yields an explanation for
peer pressure e⁄ects in teams. This explanation rests on two mechanisms:
On the one hand, the marginal return of e⁄ort is higher when agents are
inequity averse as higher e⁄orts induce coworkers to exert higher e⁄orts in
the future. But in addition, agents will have an incentive to match e⁄ort
levels exerted by their coworkers as a deviation will be credibly sanctioned
by a reduction of e⁄orts below the sel￿shly optimal level. Hence, equilibria
can be sustained in which the agents choose higher e⁄ort levels than those
exerted by purely sel￿sh agents.
143 Experimental Evidence
3.1 Experimental Design and Procedures
We then conducted a real e⁄ort experiment to study the impact of trans-
parency on team contributions. Subjects were randomly assigned to a team
consisting of two persons each. The team partners were never exchanged,
thus each participant kept his counterpart for the entire duration of the ex-
periment. Interaction was anonymous through the experimental software
such that the subjects did not know each other￿ s identity. Altogether 7 peri-
ods were played each of which lasted 8 minutes. In all periods the participants
were o⁄ered to work on the following task: The participants were requested
to determine the correct number of sevens in blocks of random numbers.4
Periods 1 and 7 (i.e. the ￿rst and the last period) were di⁄erent from the
other periods, in these periods subjects were paid according to their individ-
ual performance in the counting task. For each correct answer they received
a piece rate of 0:14e which was directly transferred to their individual ac-
count. We will call these periods the individual periods in the following. The
individual periods at the very beginning and at the end of the experiment
were introduced to provide individual ability measures for this speci￿c task
for each participant. In addition the use of these periods allows us to study
how learning or fatigue in￿ uenced the results.5
However, in all other periods (i.e. periods 2 to 6) the participants had
the choice between two options at each point in time: First, they could again
work on counting the correct number of sevens in blocks of random numbers.
In that case 0:14e were transferred to the team account for each correct
answer. After each period the amount of the team account was equally
divided between the two team members and we therefore call these periods
4An example of the task is available from the authors on request.
5For instance this might be worthwhile if we want to distinguish between fatigue and
an endgame e⁄ect when performance happens to decrease in the last team period.
15the team periods. But, alternatively, the subjects could push a time out
button at any time during the team periods which caused the screen to be
blocked for 25 seconds. During this time they were not able to continue
with the counting task but were paid 0:10e to their individual account. We
introduced the time out button to make sure that subjects had signi￿cant
opportunity costs of working on the counting task.
Whenever an answer in the calculation task was incorrect 0:01e were
subtracted from the individual account irrespective of the type of period (in-
dividual or team period). After each team period every subject was informed
about
￿ the number of blocks he had worked on in the previous period
￿ the number of correct answers he had given in the previous period
￿ the number of times he pushed the time out button in the previous
period.
In order to check for the impact of the team mate￿ s performance on
the individual e⁄ort, we introduced two conditions. Subjects in the non-
transparent condition merely received the information described above. In
the transparent condition, however, participants were additionally informed
about the number of correct answers provided by their respective counter-
part.
Altogether 208 students of various faculties participated in the exper-
iment. We recruited all subjects using an online recruitment system by
Greiner (2003). We conducted 7 sessions in May 2006 at the Cologne Labora-
tory for Economic Research, University of Cologne and used the experimental
software z-tree by Fischbacher (1999) for programming the experiment. Each
subject was seated in a separate cabin with a computer terminal. The par-
ticipants were not given any oral instructions, instead all informations were
16described on a sheet of paper laid out in each cabin.6 Additionally, the struc-
ture of the payo⁄ function and other important features of the experimental
design were repeated on the computer screen before each period started. At
the end of the experiment all subjects were informed about the sum of their
earnings in the individual periods and the team periods. Furthermore, they
were all paid a ￿xed show up fee of 2:50e. On average the subjects earned
approximately 16e. The whole procedure took about 90 minutes.
3.2 Hypotheses
From the theoretical model developed in section 2 we derive three main
hypotheses on the subjects￿behavior.
We have seen that in Proposition 3 for a > 0 transparency leads to higher
￿rst period e⁄ort choices. Therefore we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1a In periods 2 to 5 outcomes are higher in the transparent
than in the non-transparent setting.
This hypothesis illustrates the agents￿incentives to exert higher e⁄orts to
increase the team mate￿ s cost of free-riding. This e⁄ect is likely to persist as
long as there is at least one subsequent period. However, in the last period
the outcome cannot in￿ uence the team mate￿ s future behavior anymore.
Hypothesis 1b In the last team period (period 6), e⁄orts decline in the
transparent condition and the di⁄erence between the outcomes in the
two information settings diminishes.
The aggregate results should therefore be equal for both settings in the
last period.
Moreover, Proposition 2 indicates that subjects will adapt their e⁄ort in
counting according to the interim information.
6For the printed instructions see appendix.
17Hypothesis 2 In the transparency condition those subjects having made the
higher team contribution in the previous period compared to their team
mates will decrease their e⁄ort in the next period and vice versa.
Hypothesis 2 captures the e⁄ect that the agents dislike di⁄erences in
contributions between team members. Hence, the one who has taken an
early lead will reduce and the one who has fallen behind will feel obliged to
raise his e⁄ort in order to counterbalance the outcome di⁄erence from the
previous period.
3.3 Results
Let us ￿rst analyze the e⁄orts between the transparent and the non-transparent
condition and thus compare the absolute performance between treatments.
We approximate the participants￿e⁄ort by the number of correct answers
given (score) to investigate this relation.7 Still we have two further e⁄ort
measures to check the robustness of the score results which are on the one
hand the number of blocks the subject has worked on irrespective of the cor-
rectness of the result (blocks), and on the other hand the number of time outs
the subject has taken (time outs).8 Summary statistics are presented in Ta-
ble 1 where the means for the score variable are illustrated in Figure 1. The
￿gure indicates that subjects in the non-transparent condition indeed attain
lower scores than those in the transparent condition in the team periods (2
to 6). In addition there seems to be a considerable endgame e⁄ect as scores
drop in the transparent condition in the last team period (period 6). In the
non-transparent condition the e⁄ect seems to occur as well but appears to be
less pronounced.9 We analyze each period separately with a non-parametric
7The expressions in parentheses are the variable labels used in the following analysis.
8Note that the relation between the measures score and blocks and e⁄ort can be as-
sumed to be positive and that it should be negative for time outs.
9The di⁄erence between period 5 and 6 is highly signi￿cant for the transparent condition
if we use the Wilcoxon matched pairs signed rank test for dependent samples (absolute
z-value 4:720).

















1 11.6 (3.4) 11.0 (4.0) 16.3 (4.7) 17.4 (5.2) - -
2 9.5 (5.0) 6.5 (5.4) 13.7 (6.5) 10.7 (8.0) 3.6 (5.5) 7.3 (7.5)
3 9.4 (6.1) 5.8 (6.3) 11.6 (7.4) 7.8 (8.3) 6.4 (6.8) 10.6 (7.7)
4 9.6 (7.0) 5.5 (6.9) 11.3 (8.1) 7.5 (9.3) 7.8 (7.0) 11.8 (7.5)
5 9.1 (7.7) 5.7 (7.0) 10.8 (8.7) 7.8 (9.7) 8.7 (7.4) 11.6 (7.6)
6 6.4 (7.1) 4.8 (6.3) 7.9 (9.2) 6.5 (8.4) 11.8 (7.5) 12.7 (6.8)
7 16.3 (4.9) 15.3 (4.8) 22.1 (12.8) 22.2 (10.3) - -
Table 1: Means over periods and conditions (standard deviations in paren-
theses)
Mann-Whitney-U-test to check whether the di⁄erences between conditions
are signi￿cant. Comparing the mean score per team for each period we ￿nd
that in each of the periods 2 to 5 scores are signi￿cantly higher in the trans-
parent than in the non-transparent setting.10 This con￿rms our Hypothesis
1a. Hence, we can conclude that indeed transparency in team production
leads to higher e⁄ort levels and reduces free-riding behavior. It is interesting
to note that we do not ￿nd signi￿cant di⁄erences between the conditions in
period 6, the last period with team interaction. This seems to be an endgame
e⁄ect indicating that subjects indeed have contributed more in the transpar-
ent case because they rationally anticipated the positive impact of a higher
e⁄ort on the team mate￿ s future e⁄ort. Of course, in the last period this
motive became irrelevant as there was no subsequent period.
Finally, one might also argue that fatigue caused the scores to decline in
period 6. However, note that there is a substantial increase in performance in
the individual period 7. This indicates that subjects might not have su⁄ered
from fatigue but indeed did not have incentives to stick to the high e⁄ort level
10See Table A1 in the Appendix for the z-values.
19Figure 1: Scores over periods by condition
in period 6 providing evidence for Hypothesis 1b. Moreover, a comparison
of the outcomes of the two individually paid periods 1 and 7 triggering the
highest scores reveals that there are signi￿cant learning e⁄ects. The fact
that we observe higher e⁄ort levels in the individually paid periods as such,
however, is not at all surprising due to the completely di⁄erent incentive
structure. Recall that pro￿ts are divided between team members in the
team periods.
The theoretical model leads us to predict that those subjects who made
the higher team contribution in the previous period will decrease their e⁄ort
in the next period and vice versa. Thus, let us now consider the subjects￿
e⁄ort adjustment depending on the relation of their own contribution to
the team output compared to the counterpart￿ s contribution. As e⁄ort ad-
justment according to the counterpart￿ s contribution is not possible for the
non-transparent condition we initially restrict the analysis of the e⁄ort ad-
justment to the data from the transparent condition. Let us ￿rst examine how
20a subject￿ s change in scored points from one period to the next is in￿ uenced
by the score di⁄erence within his team in the previous period. According to
Hypothesis 2 we expect that those subjects having taken a lead over their
team mate in the previous period will reduce their e⁄ort in the next, while
those team members who have fallen behind will increase their e⁄ort. To
analyze this, we measure the di⁄erence in scores within the team (team dif-
ference). For the subject who produced the higher score, the team di⁄erence
variable has a positive sign and for the subject with the lower performance
the team di⁄erence variable has a negative sign. Second, we approximate
the participants￿e⁄ort adjustment by the score change variable. The score
change is de￿ned by the di⁄erence between a subject￿ s score in the current
period less the same subject￿ s score in the previous period. Thus, if a sub-
ject increased the score between two consecutive periods, the score change
is positive while it is negative if the subject decreased the score. We predict
a negative relationship between the team di⁄erence in the previous periods
and the score change from the previous to the subsequent periods. Figure 2
shows this relationship for periods 3, 4, 5, and 6.
According to Figure 2, indeed, this negative relationship seems to exist.
We test the results illustrated in the ￿gure by applying a ￿xed e⁄ects estima-
tion which we restrict to periods 2 to 6.11 The models in Table 2 examine the
in￿ uence of the team di⁄erence on the change between periods in the three
performance measures (score, blocks and time outs).12 Considering model
(1) we observe a highly signi￿cantly negative in￿ uence of the team di⁄erence
on the score change. From that we may conclude that the more a subject￿ s
score exceeded the counterpart￿ s score in the past period, the more the sub-
ject decreased his e⁄ort in the subsequent period. In turn the participants
raised the score if confronted with a negative team di⁄erence.
11Period 2 is used only as a baseline for the changes in period 3.
12The variables block change and time out change are de￿ned (analogously to score
change) as the di⁄erences between the values of the respective measure in the current
period less the value of the measure in the previous period.
21Figure 2: Relation between team di⁄erences in t￿1 and score adaptions in t
The models for blocks change (2) and time outs change (3) con￿rm this
conclusion. Model (2) demonstrates that higher performance di⁄erences
within the team do not only lead to a decrease in the number of correct
answers between the current and the previous period but also to a decrease
in the number of blocks worked on. In addition, a higher performance di⁄er-
ence in the team causes the usage of the time out button to rise (see model
(3)). It seems that the subject with the higher outcome feels free to take
time outs more often to counterbalance the team di⁄erence. This is well in
line with our theoretical results.
In the model described above we only used the within team score di⁄er-
ence from the previous period of each observation. To check the robustness
we ran a similar ￿xed e⁄ects estimation but used the mean aggregate team
di⁄erence of all past periods to explain the e⁄ort adjustments. The results










Team di⁄erence -0.563￿￿￿ -0.649￿￿￿ 0.539￿￿￿
in t-1 (0.054) (0.073) (0.061)
Constant -2.739￿￿￿ -2.852￿￿￿ 3.068￿￿￿
(0.39) (0.53) (0.44)
Observations 352 352 352
Number of subjects 88 88 88
R2 (within) 0.36 0.27 0.27
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Fixed e⁄ects estimation (period dummies included)
Table 2: The impact of di⁄erences in contributions in the previous period
results from Table 2. As another robustness check we used the information
generated in the individual periods as a proxy for subject speci￿c abilities
in a random e⁄ects regression. The ￿ndings which are illustrated in Table
A3 in the Appendix show that including these proxies for individual abilities
does not alter the results either.13
So far, we assumed in the empirical investigation that the sign of the
di⁄erence in previous contributions has no impact on the strength of the
e⁄ort adjustment. However, the theoretical model allows for the possibil-
ity that agents su⁄er to a stronger extent from disadvantageous than from
advantageous inequity. To investigate this, we ran further estimations pre-
sented in Table 3 to analyze possible asymmetries in the strength of the
e⁄ort changes between the team member who contributed more in the pre-
vious period (higher performer) and the one with the lower contribution
(lower performer). The higher performer variable is de￿ned as the maxi-
13As a further roubstness check we included a regression where we normalized the e⁄ort
proxies for learning e⁄ects, dividing them by the average e⁄ort in the same period in the










Higher performer -0.987￿￿￿ -1.092￿￿￿ 0.932￿￿￿
in t-1 (0.081) (0.11) (0.093)
Lower performer 0.139￿ 0.207￿ -0.145
in t-1 (0.081) (0.11) (0.093)
Constant 2.338￿￿￿ 0.398 0.518
(0.51) (0.72) (0.59)
Observations 352 352 352
Number of subjects 88 88 88
R2 (within) 0.45 0.33 0.34
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Fixed e⁄ects estimation (period dummies included)
Table 3: The impact of advantageous and disadvantageous inequity in con-
tributions
mum of zero and the di⁄erence between the subject￿ s and its counterpart￿ s
score. Analogously the lower performer variable is the maximum of zero and
the di⁄erence between the counterpart￿ s and the respective subject￿ s score.
Regarding models (1) and (2) we observe a signi￿cantly negative reaction
of the higher performer. This is very intuitive in light of our model because
the more a person￿ s score exceeded that of a coworker in the past period, the
more he reduces the current e⁄ort in order to attain a stronger equality in
contributions. This e⁄ect occurs for the change in scores and blocks as well
as for the time outs.
For the lower performer variable all coe¢ cients show the opposite sign,
hence, lower performers indeed seem to increase their e⁄ort levels. But the
e⁄ect sizes and levels of signi￿cance are less pronounced. This is particularly
interesting and well in line with our model. In the language of the model, it
con￿rms that actually d > a expressing that di⁄erences in contributions are
24not equally detrimental for advantageous and disadvantageous inequality. In
contrast, the subjects￿behavior implies that they seem to su⁄er to a stronger
extent from having contributed more than the coworker than from having a
￿ bad conscience￿when having contributed less. Hence, all the results are well
in line with Hypothesis 2 and the predictions of the theoretical model.
However, an alternative possible explanation for such a pattern of adap-
tation may be based on ￿regression to the mean￿ -e⁄ects.14 The nature of the
task brings about the possibility that participants made errors when count-
ing or typing in the numbers. Furthermore, the di¢ culty of the blocks could
vary slightly. When a subject had a very low performance in one period, it is
quite probable that at least part of the success was due to bad luck. On the
other hand, when a subject had a rather high performance, this may partly
be explained by good luck. If a subject performed quite well in the previ-
ous period, he or she is therefore more likely to have a lower performance
in the subsequent period, and vice versa when such an error component is
present. Hence, it is important to test to which extent our observations may
be driven by a regression to the mean e⁄ect and to which extent by a rational
e⁄ort adaptation as predicted by our model. We can do this by pooling the
data from both treatments and adding an interaction term of a treatment
dummy and the higher and lower performer variable. However, a ￿regression
to the mean￿ -e⁄ect would not only occur in the transparent but also in the
non-transparent treatment. Hence, we predict that the e⁄ort adaptation is
stronger in the transparent setting, i.e. the coe¢ cient for the interaction
terms should be signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
The results from pooled random e⁄ects regressions are presented in table
4. Note that an e⁄ort adjustment takes place also in the non-transparent
treatment, and hence a ￿regression to the mean￿ -e⁄ect does indeed emerge.
However, the overall coe¢ cient of the higher performer variable is three times
as high in the transparent treatment compared to the non-transparent one










Higher performance -0.139*** -0.182*** 0.134***
in t-1 (0.038) (0.060) (0.045)
Lower performance 0.0254 0.0178 -0.0482
in t-1 (0.038) (0.060) (0.045)
High. perf. t-1￿transparent -0.387*** -0.372*** 0.350***
(0.078) (0.12) (0.092)
Low. perf. t-1￿transparent 0.0105 0.0913 -0.00109
(0.078) (0.12) (0.092)
Transparent 0.264 -0.0310 0.0800
(0.43) (0.67) (0.50)
Observations 832 832 832
Number of subjects 208 208 208
R2 (within) 0.25 0.15 0.19
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Random e⁄ects estimation (period dummies included)
Table 4: Pooled random e⁄ects regressions
and the interaction term is highly signi￿cant. Hence, the largest part of the
adaptation in the transparent treatment must be due to an e⁄ort adaptation
based on the observation of the previous period￿ s results. For the lower per-
former variable there is no signi￿cant interaction with the treatment group.
In the language of our model this implies rather small values of a and again
con￿rms that disadvantageous inequity aversion seems to be a much stronger
behavioral force than advantageous inequity aversion.
264 Discussion
In this paper we have theoretically and experimentally analyzed the impact
of inequity aversion on e⁄ort incentives when agents work in a team in order
to provide a possible explanation for peer pressure e⁄ects. We have shown
that not only in theory but also in the experiment the e⁄ect strongly depends
on the information setting in which the task is solved.
The theoretical results suggest that when there is no information about
the team mates￿contributions at an interim stage, the agents￿inequity aver-
sion does not in￿ uence the e⁄ort choices. Hence, the players always act
identically to purely sel￿sh ones. However, if the team mate￿ s contribution
can be observed at an interim stage, the agents exert higher e⁄orts due to
two e⁄ects. On the one hand the marginal return of e⁄ort is larger as higher
e⁄orts increase the co-worker￿ s e⁄orts in the future when this co-worker dis-
likes advantageous inequity at least to some extend. But in addition, higher
e⁄ort levels are sustainable in equilibrium as agents who dislike disadvan-
tageous inequity will credibly punish deviations from the equilibrium path
by exerting e⁄orts below the best response of a sel￿sh agent in the future.
Hence, even when agents do not su⁄er at all from advantageous but only from
disadvantageous inequity, e⁄ort levels are higher and the free-rider problem
is reduced.
The subjects in our experiment indeed adapted their e⁄ort according to
the interim information they received about their counterparts￿contribution
such that they counterbalanced contributions to increase equity. But they
did not adjust in a symmetric way. According to the observed behavioral
pattern subjects who exerted higher e⁄ort levels than their team partner and
therefore were in a disadvantageous position strongly decreased their e⁄ort
in the subsequent period. Those participants having an advantage as they
had been lazier felt the need to reduce inequity by increasing their e⁄orts,
but did so to a much weaker extent leading to a less pronounced absolute
adjustment for the lower performers. Hence, the notion of an asymmetric
27e⁄ect of advantageous and disadvantageous inequity illustrated in the model
seems to be well re￿ ected in the experiment.
A key conclusion from the theoretical model as well as from the experi-
ment is that inequity averse agents work harder in the early in the game due
to higher costs of free-riding. Hence, the total sum of e⁄orts is greater in
the transparent than in the non-transparent case. Thus, we may conclude
that transparency leads to more e¢ cient outcomes and should therefore be
preferred from a social welfare point of view. Hence, the main practical im-
plication is that transparent work environments might be desirable in ￿rms
when employees work in groups. If workers adhere to a social norm evoking
feelings of guilt or anger respectively for di⁄erences in team contributions,
transparency might enhance the chance to develop bene￿cial mutual moni-
toring and in turn yield an e⁄ective reduction in free-riding.
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
The existence of the symmetric equilibrium has already been shown in the
main text. To see that there can be no asymmetric equilibrium, suppose
w.o.l.g. that ei > ej which implies
￿ ￿ ￿0 (2ei ￿ 2ej)
c
>




0 (2ei ￿ 2ej) < ￿
0 (2ej ￿ 2ei) ,
d ￿ (2ei ￿ 2ej) < a ￿ (2ej ￿ 2ei) ,
d < ￿a
which yields a contradiction.
28Proof of Proposition 2:
From solving the system of equations (3) and (4) for ei2 and ej2 the second













c + a + d
(ei1 ￿ ej1):
The total second period e⁄ort exerted is






c + a + d
￿
(ei1 ￿ ej1)
which is strictly decreasing in ei1 ￿ ej1 when d > a.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The existence of the symmetric equilibria follows directly from the text. We
show by contradiction that there are no asymmetric equilibria. Suppose that
there is an asymmetric equilibrium, i.e. ei1 > ej1. Necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for the existence would be that
￿
￿
c + 2a + d




(c + a + d)
2 (ei1 ￿ ej1) ￿ cei1 = 0
￿
￿
c + 2d + a




(c + a + d)
2 (ei1 ￿ ej1) ￿ cej1 = 0




(c+a+d)2 (ei1 ￿ ej1) > ￿ c+2d+a
c+a+d +
(c+a)ac














(ei1 ￿ ej1) ,
￿
a ￿ d
c + a + d | {z }
<0
>
cd + d2 + ca + a2
(c + a + d)
2 c(ei1 ￿ ej1)
| {z }
>0
which yields a contradiction.
To see that utility levels are higher in the transparent setting note that in
any symmetric equilibrium in which both agents choose an e⁄ort level e an
agent￿ s ￿rst period utility is equal to
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c + a + 2d





in any equilibrium the agents will have a higher utility than in the non-
transparent case.





6 0:965 not signi￿cant
￿￿￿ p < 0:01;￿￿ p < 0:05;￿ p < 0:1
Absolute value of z-statistics
Table A1: Mann-Whitney-U test: z-values regarding di⁄erences between










Team di⁄erence -0.969￿￿￿ -1.069￿￿￿ 1.018￿￿￿
in all previous periods (0.11) (0.15) (0.12)
Constant -2.739￿￿￿ -2.852￿￿￿ 3.068￿￿￿
(0.41) (0.55) (0.44)
Observations 352 352 352
Number of subjects 88 88 88
R2 (within) 0.30 0.21 0.26
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Fixed e⁄ects estimation (period dummies included)










Team di⁄erence -0.301￿￿￿ -0.358￿￿￿ 0.290￿￿￿
in the previous period (0.037) (0.051) (0.042)
Score in period 1 -0.127￿ -0.218￿￿ 0.130
(0.076) (0.10) (0.086)
Score in period 7 0.139￿￿ 0.209￿￿￿ -0.156￿￿
(0.054) (0.074) (0.061)
Constant -3.536￿￿￿ -3.009￿￿ 3.803￿￿￿
(0.88) (1.20) (0.99)
Observations 352 352 352
Number of Subjects 88 88 88
R2 (within) 0.33 0.25 0.25
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Random e⁄ects estimation (period dummies included)
Table A3: The impact of di⁄erences in contributions in the previous period
including individual ability measures
32Instructions (non-transparent condition)
Welcome to this experiment:
Please read these instructions carefully:
￿ All decisions you make in this experiment are anonymous
￿ At the end of the experiment you will also be paid out anonymously
￿ During the experiment no communication is allowed
Procedure:
This experiment consists of 7 periods, each of which lasts for 8 minutes.
Periods 1 and 7 di⁄er from periods 2 to 6
Periods 1 and 7 are played as follows:
You are requested to count the number of the ￿Sevens￿(the digit 7) in a
block of random numbers. You enter this number in the corresponding box
and con￿rm your choice with OK
Payo⁄ for the period 1 and period 7:
For each correct answer you receive 14 Cent
ATTENTION: For each wrong answer 1 Cent will automatically be deducted
from your individual account
Periods 2 to 6 of this experiment are played as follows:
You will be randomly assigned to another participant where the two of you
form a team. This assignment is the same for the whole experiment. That
is, you play with the same partner from period 2 to period 6. However, you
and your partner remain anonymous.
In periods 2 to 6 you can choose between two options:
1. You can work on the block of random numbers and count the numbers
of the ￿ Sevens￿ in this block (analogously to round 1 and 7)
OR
332. You can take a time out by pressing the ￿time out￿button. If you press
the "time out" button the counting task is blocked and you cannot
continue working on any block of random numbers for 25 seconds.
Payo⁄ for the periods 2 to period 6:
1. For each correct answer in the counting task, 14 Cents will be paid into
your team account. For each correct answer of your team partner 14
Cent will also be paid into the team account.
The team account will be equally divided between you and your partner
at the end of each period.
ATTENTION: For each wrong answer 1 Cent will automatically be
deducted from your individual account.
2. Each time you press the "time out" button 10 Cent will be paid into
your individual account.
After each period you will see a table on the screen displaying the following
information:
1. The number of blocks you ￿nished in the previous period
2. The number of correct answers you gave in the previous period
3. The number of time outs you took in the previous period
The table with the details for the particular period looks as follows:
Screenshot
Your partner receives the same information about his own performance. Nei-
ther you nor your partner learn about the number of correct answers the other
team member gave in the respective round. After the last period (period 7)
you will be informed about your total payo⁄. In addition to that you re-
ceive a show up fee of 2.50e. Please stay at your seat until we call on your
cabin number. Please bring along these instructions and your cabin number.
Thank you for your participation!
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